Playbook for the G20 Brisbane summit by Mike Callaghan
Mike Callaghan
Playbook for the  
Brisbane G20 Summit
studies
centre
31 Bligh Street Sydney NSW 2000
Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 Fax: +61 2 8238 9005
PO Box H-159 Australia Square NSW 1215
ABN 40 102 792 174
Twitter: @lowyinstitute
www.lowyinstitute.org
Co
ve
r i
ma
ge
 co
urt
esy
 of
 B
ris
ba
ne
 M
ark
eti
ng
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank. Its mandate 
ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political 
and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to:
•	  produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy 
and to contribute to the wider international debate.
•	  promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high 
quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, 
seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences.
Funding to establish the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy has 
been provided by the Australian Government.
The views expressed in this publication are entirely the authors’ own and not those of the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy or of the G20 Studies Centre. 
Playbook for the G20 Brisbane Summit
Executive 
Summary
It is important that the Brisbane G20 Leaders’ Summit be 
a success. It must help ‘reenergise’ the G20, because the 
world needs an effective G20. But there is more at stake 
for Australia. If the G20 is not effective, any alternative 
forum for international economic cooperation would 
likely exclude Australia. 
For the Brisbane summit to be a success, Australia will need 
to improve the way the G20 works, define a focused agenda 
and directly engage leaders. A pragmatic, business-like 
approach is required. Most importantly, the Brisbane 
summit must achieve tangible, meaningful outcomes. 
The overall objective should be to continue the quest for 
stronger, more sustainable and more equitable economic 
and jobs growth. To give substance to these objectives, the 
Brisbane summit must make progress on some difficult, 
but important, international economic issues. Priorities 
should include:  
• Developing a clearer, more consistent and more 
coordinated strategy for restoring global growth. The 
G20 no longer has a consistent growth narrative. An 
outcome from the Brisbane summit should be the ‘G20 
Coordinated Growth Strategy’. 
• Breathing life into the multilateral trading system. In a 
world that may be dominated by mega-regional trading 
blocs, the Brisbane summit should begin the process of 
resurrecting the multilateral trading system.  
• Tackling climate change financing so as to build 
momentum for the climate change negotiations in 
2015. The G20 cannot do the work of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), but it has to get serious on climate change. 
• Delivering tangible progress on the international effort 
to combat tax evasion and avoidance. This was a major 
outcome from St. Petersburg and involved the endorsement 
of high-level principles. The ball has been passed to 
Australia and it has to show progress on what is a complex 
and contentious issue. 
• ‘Mainstreaming’ development into the G20 agenda and 
not treating it as an ‘add-on’. 
To achieve outcomes in these areas will require a strategic 
game plan and a major, coordinated 12-month campaign. 
Australia will need a good ‘playbook’ for the Brisbane 
summit to be a success. 
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1United team, strong captain, clear game-plan
Australia will chair the G20 for 12 months from 1 December 
2013. It will be the largest international economic meeting 
held in Australia. But it is more than just an opportunity to 
showcase the country to a large number of world leaders, 
many of whom will be visiting Australia for the first time. 
As G20 chair, Australia will have the opportunity to influence 
the international economic agenda, and importantly, to 
strengthen international economic governance. Australia 
must make the most of this opportunity. As an open trading 
economy that relies upon the world’s savings to help finance 
its investment opportunities, Australia’s economic fortunes 
are tied to the success of the G20 in building a stronger and 
more stable global economy.   
Many commentators have expressed high expectations for 
Australia’s performance as G20 chair. This is a testament 
to the contribution the country has made to international 
forums in the past. But it also reflects concerns that the 
G20’s effectiveness is slipping and the desire that Australia 
will ‘reenergise’ the forum. Meeting these expectations 
will require a major effort not only by the government, but 
by many non-government actors, as well. It will require 
a united team, a strong captain and a comprehensive 
‘game-plan’. 
This paper outlines the strategy, priorities and steps required 
for the Brisbane summit to be a success – a ‘playbook’ for 
Australia’s G20 presidency. It covers five key elements:
• The motivation: an effective G20 is important to 
Australia and the global economy.
• The challenge: the growing concerns that the G20’s 
effectiveness is waning.
• The strategy: the need for a coherent agenda, clear narrative, 
greater transparency and stronger accountability. 
• The priorities:  the main, or ‘headline’, outcomes that 
should emerge from the Brisbane Leaders’ Summit.
• The campaign: the importance of a targeted 
12-month campaign involving both government and 
non-government actors working together to achieve the 
key outcomes identified for the Brisbane summit.
The Motivation
Hosting a successful G20 summit should not be just a 
matter of national pride for Australia. An effective G20 is 
important to Australia and to the world. The G20 provides 
a forum for international economic cooperation among 
developed and emerging markets and the opportunity to 
deal with difficult global economic issues in a manner that 
will benefit all economies.  
The 2008 global financial crisis was the catalyst for the 
G20 becoming a leaders’ level forum. The makeup of the 
G20, bringing together developed and emerging economies, 
reflects the changing shape of the global economy. Emerging 
markets and developing countries now account for just over 
50 per cent of global output. At the turn of this century 
they accounted for around 37 per cent. This meant that 
any attempt at a coordinated response to the expanding 
financial crisis in 2008 could not be based on a forum, such 
as the G8, composed solely of major advanced economies. 
Emerging markets and developing countries such as China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa had to be included. The 
global economy had become so diverse that it could no 
longer be led by one country or a small group of advanced 
economies.  
Having succeeded with its initial response to the 2008 crisis, 
the longer-term challenge facing the G20 is to transform 
itself from being a ‘global crisis responder’ to an ongoing 
‘global steering committee’ for the world’s economy, to 
use the words of the former Canadian prime minister, 
Paul Martin.1 But, in a multi-polar global economy, with 
new players on the scene that have different economic 
structures and cultural backgrounds, making the G20 
an effective forum for global economic leadership and 
economic cooperation is a difficult task.
Because of its diverse membership, the G20 is better 
positioned than any other current forum to promote 
international economic cooperation. Although the mere 
existence of economic interlinkages and the interdependent 
nature of the global economy will not inevitably lead to 
closer cooperation. And there is no certainty that the G20 
will provide the economic leadership that the world needs. 
But it is clearly in the interests of Australia and all countries 
that it does so.
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An alternative to the G20 would exclude 
Australia
Australia has a narrower interest in the success of the G20. 
If the G20 fails, it is highly likely that any replacement 
forum would exclude countries such as Australia. One of 
the criticisms of the G20 is that it is too large. A smaller 
grouping would likely include the major advanced and 
emerging markets and economies representing particular 
regions of the world. Australia may not be included in 
such circumstances.
Australia’s exclusion from any new global ‘steering 
committee’ would represent more than just an injury to 
national pride. Australia would lose the opportunity it 
now has to influence, at the highest political level, global 
economic initiatives with a direct impact on the country, 
including the development of international financial 
regulatory standards, the reform of international financial 
institutions and the future course of multilateral economic 
agreements. Countries such as Australia have much to offer 
to international groupings. As Colin Bradford has noted, 
middle powers tend to represent more than just their own 
interests and place multilateralism nearer the centre of 
their foreign policies.2 They also tend to take a pragmatic 
approach to global problems rather than an ideological one, 
as well as cushioning the tensions between major powers. 
In addition, Australia has a record of providing ideas, 
consensus-building skills and building trust.
It is in Australia’s self-interest, and the interests of the 
global economy, for the G20 to be an effective forum 
for international economic cooperation. Australia must, 
therefore, do everything possible to make its term as G20 
chair as successful as possible.
The Challenge
The general consensus is that the G20 has seen its best days 
and that those were in its role as a ‘crisis responder’. The 
Washington summit in November 2008, the London summit 
in April 2009 and the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009 
provided an effective response to the global financial crisis. 
G20 leaders pledged to stimulate economic activity through 
combined fiscal action of over $5 trillion to strengthen 
financial regulation, avoid protectionism and expand the 
lending capacity of the international financial institutions. 
Their action helped to stabilise financial markets and 
contain a likely economic free-fall.
More recently, there has been growing criticism that the G20 
has failed to live up to the initial high hopes of introducing 
a new age of global economic cooperation. Recent leaders’ 
summits have been described as little more than talk-shops. 
The general image of the G20 is reflected in the summary 
of headlines and reactions to recent summits compiled by 
Barry Carin and David Shorr:
Toronto’s 2010 G20 summit was described as ‘A Failure 
All Around’. The Guardian trashed the 2011 Cannes 
meeting with the headline ‘G20 Summit: Slumping to 
the Occasion’, complaining the ‘G20 had a chance to 
get a grip on the sovereign debt crisis. But they failed, 
and all the big questions remain on the table’. Inability 
to resolve the Eurozone debt crisis was described as ‘A 
Greek Tragedy and a Grand Failure’. The 2012 Los Cabos 
summit was no different; Oxfam complained, ‘G20 Fails 
1 Billion Hungry people Worldwide: Development and 
Food Security Sidelined’. 3
Commentary on the St. Petersburg summit in September 
2013 has been similarly negative. In part, this is because the 
summit was overshadowed by tensions between the major 
powers over the Syrian crisis. Carsten Volkery, writing in 
Der Spiegel, said that the summit was a failure on all fronts, 
both on foreign policy and economic policy.4 Alessandro 
Leipold declared that the St. Petersburg summit represented 
a death certificate for global economic cooperation.5 
In a similar vein, Thomas Bernes said that the St. Petersburg 
summit was the most forgettable of the eight G20 summits 
held to date and that ‘the G20 may be becoming forgettable 
as a forum to provide the global economic leadership that it 
was created to achieve.’6 
Much of the criticism is harsh and reflects unrealistic 
expectations of what can be achieved by any international 
forum. The G20 is also a victim of its own early success 
in responding to the global financial crisis in 2008-09. In 
addition, a considerable amount of the criticism reflects the 
failure of individual governments to implement necessary 
domestic economic policies. And notwithstanding the 
concerns over the St. Petersburg summit, there were 
some notable outcomes. These include: the extension of 
the standstill on protectionist measures until 2016; the 
commitment to automatically exchange tax information 
among G20 members by end 2015; the endorsement of 
the OECD action plan on combatting corporate tax 
avoidance; and the agreement to phase out the production 
of hydrocarbons through the Montreal protocol.
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The G20 does have problems
But the G20 does have problems. It has failed to grapple 
with some of the thorniest issues confronting the global 
economy. The addition of new items to the agenda without 
the resolution of existing ones has given the impression of 
‘mission creep’. The G20’s credibility has been damaged 
by the failure to deliver on key promises, such as the 
commitments to complete the Doha Development Round 
of international trade talks and to implement reform of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota and governance. 
The G20’s processes are becoming increasingly bureaucratic. 
Its communiqués are getting longer but do little more than 
endorse reports prepared by international organisations and 
officials.
At a broader level, the G20 has failed to meet its 
commitments to restore strong global economic growth, 
whilst unemployment remains unacceptably high in a 
number of countries. Five years after the global financial 
crisis, the IMF is still predicting that global growth will 
remain subdued at slightly above 3 per cent, the same as 
2012 and lower than forecast in April 2013.7 In the years 
prior to the crisis in 2008, world growth averaged 4 per cent 
per annum.
Some of the reasons cited for the apparent decline in the 
G20’s effectiveness have included the increasing breadth 
of the agenda, the size of the forum and the difficulty of 
reaching agreement among countries with diverse interests. 
The common resolve demonstrated at the Washington and 
London summits during the height of the global financial 
crisis has evaporated. Economies have recovered at different 
speeds and have varying policy requirements. As Alessandro 
Leipold observes, while everybody pays lip service to the 
world’s growing interdependence, passivity quickly comes 
to the fore when the first, frail shoots of economic recovery 
appear.8
The challenge Australia faces as chair in 2014 is to reverse 
the widespread perception that the effectiveness of the 
G20 is on the slide. The best way this can be done is by 
ensuring that significant progress is achieved on a few 
major international economic issues at the Brisbane summit. 
To achieve that goal, Australia will need to strengthen 
the G20 by ensuring that there are clear and common 
objectives, better communication, greater transparency and 
strengthened accountability.
The Strategy 
When leaders address the media at the conclusion of the 
Brisbane summit on 16 November 2014, they should have 
the same message as to the key outcomes of the summit. This 
has not been the case with recent summits. But to achieve 
substantive outcomes, more rigour has to be introduced into 
G20 processes, particularly in terms of setting the agenda.
The way to achieve greater coherence in the G20’s agenda 
is to reposition the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth at the core of the G20’s activities. This 
was the original intent when the Framework was introduced 
at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009. As leaders said 
in Pittsburgh:
Today we are launching a Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable, and Balanced Growth. To put in place this 
framework, we commit to develop a process whereby 
we set out our objectives, put forward policies to achieve 
these objectives, and together assess our progress.9
Since the Pittsburgh summit, however, the Framework 
has been relegated, along with the associated Mutual 
Assessment Process, to a sub-component of the finance 
stream of the G20’s work. The discussion of the Framework 
is confined to an agenda item on the global economy in the 
meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. 
The preparatory work is undertaken by the Framework 
Working Group, consisting of mid-level officials. Much of 
the focus is on macroeconomic issues, although recently 
there have been efforts to introduce a system to assess 
members’ progress on implementing structural reforms. 
Little of the working group’s activities are made public and 
not much attention is paid to the material it produces. 
Placing the Framework at the core of the G20’s work will 
help reinforce that the agenda items are interrelated. For 
example, creating the right environment to support growth 
will require a regulatory environment that supports a 
stable and efficient financial system, open, competitive and 
flexible labour and product markets and efforts to prevent 
corruption. Similarly, trade liberalisation is central to 
creating jobs and promoting development, which in turn is 
a core aspect of lifting global growth.
One of Australia’s objectives as chair in 2014 should be to 
re-launch the Framework as the overarching structure for the 
forum. If this could be achieved, it would be an important 
legacy of Australia’s presidency that would strengthen the 
G20. One step towards making the Framework more central 
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would be for the existing Framework Working Group to be 
renamed the ‘Economic Policy Working Group’. If there is 
to be a working group on the Framework, its task should be 
to coordinate all G20 activities and it should report directly 
to the sherpas.
Clear objectives, strong accountability, 
better communication
As part of putting more rigour into the G20 processes, 
Australia should outline very early in its presidency what 
it considers to be the objective for the G20 in 2014 and the 
specific priorities to be pursued. The broad objective should 
be to ‘promote stronger, sustainable, and more equitable 
economic and jobs growth’. But it will be important to move 
beyond such a high-level objective and outline a few, specific 
priorities for leaders to address at the Brisbane summit. 
Central to the credibility of the G20 is its ability to deliver on 
its commitments. At every summit, each member provides a 
status report on its implementation of policy commitments. 
It is a rather perfunctory document that receives no public 
attention. One result is that the G20 continues to be 
criticised for failing to have a rigorous accountability 
mechanism. Efforts at introducing ‘peer review’ into the 
G20, particularly through the Mutual Assessment Process, 
remain a work in progress and the rigour of the exercise is 
unclear.
The challenge is to make G20 members accountable for 
their commitments without turning it into a finger-pointing 
exercise that would be divisive and detract from efforts 
to build greater cooperation. G20 members are more 
likely to deliver on their commitments if they feel there 
is likely to be domestic political backlash from any 
failure to implement commitments, or more importantly, 
to achieve results.10 Better public communication and 
transparency are, therefore, important aspects of improving 
members’ performance.
There are a number of steps that Australia should 
pursue to strengthen accountability. A more coordinated 
accountability approach could be introduced for all 
G20 activities. Currently, each agenda item has its own 
accountability mechanisms. For example, the Framework 
Working Group is developing an accountability framework 
that is attempting to incorporate peer reviews. The 
Development Working Group has also introduced an 
accountability report. Progress on implementing financial 
sector reforms is overseen by the Financial Stability Board 
and reported separately to the G20. On trade matters, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) prepare 
reports on compliance with the standstill on protectionist 
measures. Then there is the very perfunctory ‘overview’ 
report that is intended to report on members’ progress in 
implementing policy commitments. 
To help develop greater cohesion around the G20 process, 
a more thorough accountability report would pull together 
the key assessments from the various separate reports and 
replace the current brief, member-prepared report on the 
implementation of policy commitments. In addition, rather 
than just focusing on members’ self-assessments, greater 
attention could be given to the assessments of members’ 
performance as prepared by international organisations, 
along with input from the non-government sector, including 
business, civil society and think tanks.
Communication has been a weakness of the G20. The 
length of communiqués and statements from each successive 
summit has grown. The leaders’ statement from the 
Washington summit in 2008 was 10 pages. At St. Petersburg 
in 2013, the leaders’ declaration was 27 pages, with over 200 
pages of supporting material. The leaders’ declaration now 
contains detail on nearly every item being considered in the 
G20 process, descriptive statements and lengthy references 
to reports prepared by international organisations and 
officials. The result is that it is hard to discern what the key 
messages and decisions were from the summit. 
The same trend is evident in other G20 meetings. When 
the United Kingdom chaired the G20 in 2009, the then 
chancellor of the exchequer, Alistair Darling, had a rule that 
the communiqués from meetings of G20 finance ministers 
and central bank governors could not exceed two pages. 
This focused the mind of the drafters. In contrast, the 
communiqué from the July 2013 meeting of G20 finance 
ministers and central bank governors was nine pages. 
Australia should prepare shorter, sharper G20 statements. 
In particular, the leaders’ declaration following the Brisbane 
summit should focus on the main items actually agreed at 
the summit. A longer statement covering progress and the 
state of play on all the issues on the G20 agenda should be 
covered in a separate release, although the overall volume of 
supporting documents should also be significantly reduced. 
A similar approach should be adopted for meetings of G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors in 2014.
By placing the Framework at the core of the G20’s agenda, 
and by making a concerted effort to explain how all 
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the agenda items contribute to meeting members’ shared 
objectives, Australia can improve the G20’s communications. 
Of course, it is always easier to prepare a clear, concise 
communiqué if something significant is achieved at a 
summit. To do that, however, Australia will need to have 
clear priorities for its presidency.
The Priorities
A critical aspect of the G20 process is the involvement of 
national leaders. It provides the opportunity for them to 
address intractable global economic issues. This opportunity 
should not be wasted in Brisbane.
British Prime Minister David Cameron noted, in his report 
on global governance at the Cannes summit in 2011, that the 
G20’s ‘resources, particularly its leader’s time and political 
capital, are limited. It must therefore manage its formal 
agenda accordingly, by balancing the changing agenda of an 
annual presidency with the need to retain focus and avoid 
overstretch.’11
Australia should put David Cameron’s comments into 
practice and propose a focused agenda for the Brisbane 
summit, aimed at making tangible progress on some priority 
international economic issues. But it will be important to 
get leaders involved, because it is only leaders who can 
achieve progress on the most difficult political issues. The 
history of the G20, particularly its response to the 2008 
global financial crisis, underlines what can be achieved 
when leaders become directly involved. However the trend 
in recent summits has been for leaders to largely endorse 
the work of international organisations or officials. The 
summit is in danger of becoming a routine international 
meeting where leaders only focus on the agenda just prior to 
arriving. Australia has to engage leaders well in advance of 
the actual meeting on the importance of making progress at 
the summit on some priority international issues. 
To achieve substantive outcomes, the G20 chair needs to 
be prepared to have the political battles necessary to make 
progress. Considerable preparation, time and effort will 
be required – including the chair’s direct involvement in 
negotiations with other leaders. While Australia must set 
clear priorities and aim for tangible outcomes, it must also 
be realistic about what can be achieved. Expectations need 
to be managed. Many issues cannot be resolved at one 
summit. But if a contentious issue is seriously addressed, 
and this builds momentum towards resolving the issue, then 
this can be a valuable outcome.
Having a leaders’ agenda that focuses on a few major 
international economic issues does not mean abandoning 
all the other work that is currently being done by the G20. 
Much of this work is valuable and should be continued. 
The G20 should formally adopt a multi-tracked approach, 
with the leaders’ summit focusing on a few critical issues 
while the rest of the work is continued at the official or 
ministerial level in consultation with the international 
organisations. As noted, there should be a single, focused 
leaders’ declaration coming from the summit, with the rest 
of the G20’s activities recorded in a separate G20 report that 
is issued by the chair.
Priority issues for a G20 leaders’ summit should be those 
that are important for the future of the global economy, 
those that cannot be solved by individual countries acting 
unilaterally, and those where the international efforts to 
make progress are stuck. Based on these criteria, the priorities 
for the Brisbane summit should include the following:
1.  Developing a ‘G20 coordinated growth 
strategy’ 
Five years after the crisis, there has not been a strong 
recovery in the global economy and growth remains below 
potential. Unemployment is high, particularly among 
the young, public debt is at worrying levels, financial 
fragmentation is growing, monetary policy is in uncharted 
waters and capital flows are volatile. There is also reason 
to be concerned about the sustainability of current growth 
rates, given the slowdown in emerging economies and the 
vulnerabilities confronting many economies. In addition, 
inequality is growing within most countries. 
In recent years, the G20 has struggled to deliver a clear, 
consistent and coordinated message as to how members are 
cooperating to restore growth and create jobs. The focus has 
been more on areas of disagreement than those of agreement, 
as illustrated by the debate over ‘growth versus austerity’ or 
the concerns by many members over the use of quantitative 
easing by some major developed economies, with resulting 
concerns over ‘currency wars’. As Pierre Siklos has observed, 
‘the G20 has given the appearance of not being able to 
convincingly sing from the same song sheet.’12
The Action Plan released at the St. Petersburg summit 
acknowledged the risks to the global economy, but the 
‘action’ consisted largely of a listing of policies already 
announced or already being implemented by members.13 
There was little mention of the need to cooperate and little 
evidence that G20 countries have a coherent strategy and 
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are actually cooperating in their policy settings, recognising 
that by acting together they can achieve outcomes that 
exceed those they can achieve by acting alone. 
A priority for Australia as chair in 2014 must be to get 
G20 members back on the same page and to demonstrate 
that the G20 truly is an effective forum for dealing with 
international economic issues and fostering cooperation. In 
particular, the G20 must develop a clearer, more consistent 
narrative about how members are cooperating to strengthen 
global economic growth and create jobs. The G20 must also 
demonstrate that it is backing its words about cooperation 
with deeds. To that end some of the steps the G20 could take 
in 2014 include:
• In the St. Petersburg declaration, leaders requested their 
finance ministers to ‘develop further comprehensive 
growth strategies for presentation to the Brisbane Summit’. 
This should be a top priority for the G20 in 2014, with 
the addition that the focus should be on developing 
‘coordinated’ growth strategies. It is also an opportunity 
to place the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth at the centre of the G20 activities and 
demonstrate that all of the G20’s work is part of the 
growth strategy. Steps should be taken to revitalise both 
the Mutual Assessment Process and the ‘action plans’ that 
are released after each summit. As noted, these plans have 
hitherto been a list of already announced commitments 
by countries and receive little attention. The plans should 
reflect how countries are cooperating. The development 
of a ‘G20 coordinated growth strategy’ for the Brisbane 
summit should not be left to officials. Finance ministers 
and central bank governors must be directly involved and 
it should be a key component of the leaders’ summit in 
November 2014. 
• The preparation of a ‘G20 coordinated growth strategy’ 
is also an opportunity to refocus the meetings of finance 
ministers and central bank governors. These meetings 
should not be excessively procedural or burdened with 
a fixed agenda. Finance ministers and governors must 
be responsive to the challenges that can quickly arise 
in a volatile global economy, but they must also be 
focused on the longer-term policy measures needed to 
restore growth. The challenge confronting ministers 
and governors in 2014 will continue to be dealing 
with weak global demand at a time when the limits 
of accommodative fiscal and monetary policies have 
largely been reached. Ministers and governors will 
have to prepare and communicate in 2014 an economic 
policy mix that provides for the orderly consolidation 
of fiscal positions, the gradual exit from the various 
extraordinary monetary policy settings, combined with 
measures to boost private demand. Critical to boosting 
private demand will be an accelerated program of 
structural reforms.
• While the importance of more decisive action on 
structural reforms was recognised at St. Petersburg, one 
of the constraints of the current G20 arrangements is 
that most finance ministers do not have responsibility in 
their jurisdictions for the required structural measures. 
Attempts to deal with this have included one-off joint 
G20 meetings, such as the meeting of G20 finance 
ministers and labour ministers in 2013, or separate 
one-off meetings of G20 ministers of labour or trade, 
for example. An initiative that should be introduced in 
2014 is to open up the finance ministers’ process so that 
other ministers directly responsible for the structural 
reforms being considered can attend on an ‘as needed’ 
basis. The decision on which ministers should go to a 
meeting would depend on the topics being discussed and 
the domestic division of responsibilities. Each country 
would have two seats at the table at each meeting, but 
who occupied the seats would depend on the topic being 
discussed.
• One area of focus of the finance stream in 2014 should 
be on improving the oversight of international efforts 
to strengthen financial regulation. This is meant to be 
a core priority of the forum, but the G20 has largely 
become a rubber stamp for the technical work of 
the Financial Stability Board. The issue of financial 
regulation requires more dedicated ministerial oversight 
than it is currently receiving, as the finance sector will 
be the source of future crises, just as it has been in the 
past. The G20 should not be caught up in the details 
of financial regulation, but should focus on the bigger 
picture, such as assessing overall progress on achieving a 
stable and efficient financial sector that meets the needs 
of the real economy. One way that this could be achieved 
would be for the G20 finance ministers’ meetings 
that take place at the time of the spring meetings of 
the IMF to focus on financial regulation. This would 
help remove the current duplication associated with 
back-to-back meetings of G20 finance ministers and the 
IMF’s International Monetary and Finance Committee 
(IMFC). These meetings currently have similar agendas 
and there is an overlap of members.
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2.  Breathing life back into the multilateral 
trading system
The expansion of international trade, which has been a 
driving force behind the growth in the global economy, has 
been facilitated by a multilateral system that has helped 
set and police the rules of the game. But the global trading 
system is in trouble. The most obvious symptom is the 
repeated failure to complete the Doha Development Round 
of world trade talks. Although there are other problems, 
including: the world’s most pressing trade policy issues not 
being on the negotiating table; the current system no longer 
being appropriate for a world of supply chains; growing 
state intervention in trade flows and a gradual, cumulative 
rise in trade distortions.14
In terms of concluding the Doha Development Round, the 
G20 has failed to show leadership. At various summits, 
leaders have committed to completing an ambitious and 
balanced conclusion to the round. At the Seoul summit, 
leaders said they recognised that 2011 was a critical window 
of opportunity and they were now entering the ‘end game’. 
But this sense of urgency was not transmitted back to trade 
negotiators in Geneva. The G20 has conspicuously and 
repeatedly failed to deliver on one of the most intractable 
issues confronting the global economy, and this has damaged 
the G20’s credibility.
An area where the G20 has been more successful is the 
standstill against new protectionist measures. At their 
first meeting in Washington DC in November 2008, 
G20 leaders committed ‘… within the next 12 months, 
we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment 
or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export 
restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.’15 
This standstill commitment was extended at the London 
summit in April 2009 until end-2010, renewed until 
end-2013 at the Toronto summit in June 2010 and 
extended again at the Los Cabos summit until end-2014. 
In St. Petersburg, the standstill was extended to end-2016 
and leaders reaffirmed their commitment to roll back 
new protectionist measures.
According to assessments of the standstill by the WTO, 
OECD and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the G20’s record on compliance 
is positive. While there has been a steady accumulation 
of trade restrictions by G20 members, there has been no 
widespread retreat to protectionism. However, other trade 
policy assessments have not been as sanguine, pointing to a 
rise in ‘murky protectionism’ by G20 countries in the form 
of non-tariff barriers that are not subject to multilateral 
trade rules.16 
In the absence of progress on multilateral trade liberalisation, 
countries are voting with their feet, stepping outside the WTO 
to negotiate bilateral and regional trade agreements, with the 
current focus on what are described as ‘mega-regional’ deals. 
The mega-regional trading arrangements being pursued by 
the United States – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – threaten to divide the global trading system into 
two large, although non-exclusive, regions defined by 
discriminatory preferences.17 They discriminate against 
major emerging markets and developing countries. The 
IMF has warned that the regional focus of trade agreements 
entails risks of fragmentation in global trade, absent a 
renewed commitment to completing the Doha round.18 If the 
G20 is truly the premier forum for international economic 
cooperation, it should be concerned about this situation and 
should do something about it.
Trade is on the G20 agenda and cannot be ignored under 
the Australian presidency. A decisive milestone in terms 
of the future of the multilateral trading system is likely 
to be the outcome from the Ninth WTO Ministerial 
Conference (MC9) to be held in Bali from 3-6 December 
2013. Recognising that a comprehensive package will not 
eventuate from the Doha round, the aim at this ministerial 
is to reach agreement in a few areas, specifically trade 
facilitation, agriculture and particular issues relevant to least 
developed countries (LDCs). This includes implementing 
the agreement to grant duty-free and quota-free access 
for goods originating from LDCs. The St. Petersburg 
leaders’ declaration states that a successful outcome at 
MC9 would be a stepping stone to further multilateral 
trade liberalisation, and provide confidence for future Doha 
negotiations. Leaders called on all WTO members to show 
the necessary flexibility to ‘bridge existing gaps and deliver 
positive and balanced results at MC9.’19
A successful outcome of the Bali WTO trade ministers’ 
meeting would mean that there was life in the multilateral 
system – and in the WTO as a negotiating forum for trade 
liberalisation. It would also provide a basis for the G20 
to help revive the multilateral trading system in 2014. 
However, if the ‘existing gaps’ are not bridged and little is 
achieved at the Bali meeting, that would be a body blow to 
the multilateral system. In that case, there will be an even 
greater need for the G20 to bring the disappointment of the 
Doha round to an end and set an agenda for reviving the 
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multilateral trading system. Unlike at previous summits, 
in 2014 the G20 leaders would not be able to deal with the 
‘trade issue’ by simply expressing a commitment to some 
future WTO meeting. In 2014, the G20 will likely have to 
tackle the future of the WTO head on.
Specific proposals that could be advanced through the G20 
in support of the multilateral trading system include:
• Placing international trade at the heart of the G20’s 
commitment to deliver economic growth and 
employment and to promote development.
• Upgrading and refining the standstill agreement on 
protectionism to cover WTO-consistent measures of 
protectionism (non-tariff barriers) and achieve actual 
progress in rolling back new protectionist measures.
• If there is progress at MC9, building on the momentum 
and putting a major effort into advancing further 
aspects of liberalisation. If MC9 is not a success, the 
G20 should focus on aspects that can still be saved, 
such as an agreement dealing with trade facilitation, the 
provision of duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs’ 
goods, phasing out farm export subsidies, reforming the 
WTO dispute resolution process, and introducing new 
disciplines on food export controls.
• Encouraging the WTO to bring the trade policy 
agenda into the twenty- first century by recognising the 
importance of services trade and global supply chains.
• Recognising the scale of the proposed mega-regional 
trading arrangements and seeking to negotiate the 
provisions of the mega-regionals with a view to their 
global application.
• Advancing plurilateral agreements within the WTO, 
whereby subsets of countries forge agreements on certain 
issues and allow those countries with reservations to 
stand aside.
3. Building momentum on climate change 
The world’s climate is the clearest example of a global public 
good, and as such, a clear candidate for G20 attention. It is 
an area where global cooperation is essential. Yet the world 
continues to search for an international agreement to deal 
with human impact on the global climate. Global talks 
have not yet provided an agreement to cut emissions of 
greenhouse gases.
The proposal for a new international legally binding 
agreement to curb emissions was rejected at the UNFCCC 
conference in Copenhagen in 2009. At the UNFCCC 
conference in Doha in 2012, it was agreed that a new round 
of negotiations would aim to achieve an international 
protocol on climate change by the time of the UNFCCC 
conference in Paris in 2015.
As the history of the UNFCCC negotiations has 
demonstrated, reaching an international agreement on 
reducing emissions will be very difficult. The problem 
of equity is a major obstacle. Developing countries make 
the point that the bulk of the existing stock of emissions 
was caused by developed countries, which now insist that 
developing countries cannot use the same high-emissions 
path to development. Consequently, developing countries 
expect developed countries to provide financing and 
technology to meet their costs in dealing with and adapting 
to climate change. International climate change negotiations 
are ultimately about money.20 As Martin Khor notes, 
‘developing countries have development imperatives, and 
their ability to undertake climate actions depends on the 
extent of support they receive from developed countries.’21
At the Copenhagen UNFCCC conference, developed country 
signatories agreed to provide $30 billion by end-2012 in 
‘fast-start’ finance and to mobilise $100 billion annually 
to assist with climate adaptation and mitigation efforts 
by developing countries. Funding was to come from an 
unspecified variety of sources, public and private, bilateral 
and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. 
Donor countries have met their initial commitment to 
fast-start finance. But for various reasons, including the 
legacy of the financial crisis, a funding hiatus looms between 
the end of the ‘fast-start’ climate funding (2010-12) and the 
2020 commitment. As Barry Carin states, ‘the climate change 
debate is stuck. The many justifiable projects to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change are sidelined for lack of money.’22 
In 2010, the UN Secretary-General’s high-level Advisory 
Group on Climate Change Financing published an analysis 
of different financing sources that could be used to raise the 
$100 billion per year by 2020. The report claims that the goal 
can be achieved by a combination of measures, including the 
introduction of a carbon price, a tax on the maritime and 
aviation sectors, currency taxes and financial transaction 
taxes. The feasibility and likelihood of implementing such 
taxes was not canvassed. Another funding option that has 
been canvassed involves a special allocation of the IMF’s 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR). But this would require 85 
per cent of IMF shareholders to agree to such an allocation. 
9Playbook for the G20 Brisbane Summit
Progress on climate change financing, which is critical to 
progress on reducing global emissions, is a prime example 
of an intractable global issue requiring input at the highest 
political level. As the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation, the G20 should provide political 
direction to help advance climate change talks. It is on 
the agenda, but progress has not been encouraging. In 
2011, the G20 French presidency requested a report from 
international organisations and regional development 
banks on financing climate change adaptation. The group’s 
report, Mobilizing Climate Finance, covered such options 
as carbon taxes, financial transaction taxes, levies on the 
aviation and maritime sectors, green climate bonds as well 
as redirecting fossil fuel subsidies.23 But the report was 
never discussed and the political feasibility of the options 
was never explored. In Los Cabos in 2012, G20 leaders 
established a study group on climate finance. The study 
group achieved little and released a progress report that 
identified its future work as the sharing of experiences and 
the exchanging of information.24
At the St. Petersburg summit, US President Barack Obama 
and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a bilateral 
agreement to eliminate potent greenhouse gases through 
the Montreal Protocol, the 1987 agreement that phased 
out ozone-depleting substances. This came on top of the 
announcement in July 2013 by the US-China Climate 
Change Working Group of initiatives in the areas of: 
transportation; smart grids; carbon capture, utilisation and 
storage; energy efficiency; and data transparency.25 These 
initiatives have led to speculation that the United States and 
China are ‘finally getting serious about climate change.’26
The G20 as a whole will, however, also need to get serious 
about climate change. In St. Petersburg, leaders reiterated 
their support for a protocol on curbing emissions by 2015, 
supported the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund, 
and called on finance ministers to build on the work of the 
G20 Climate Finance Study Group and report back to them 
at the Brisbane summit. However, if the current approach 
of the Study Group is pursued, there will be no progress in 
advancing climate change financing. The G20 would have 
provided little, if any, support for the UNFCCC negotiations 
seeking to reach a new agreement by 2015.
The G20 should seek to build momentum on climate change 
issues in 2014. It should do this in two ways. First, explore in 
depth the feasibility of the various climate financing options 
that have been raised and seek to find a way forward. The 
aim should be to narrow the options and either identify 
a preferred approach to mobilising the required climate 
change financing or, alternatively, isolate the issues that will 
need to be resolved in order to make progress. Second, the 
G20 should consider where and how climate funds should 
be spent, recognising that progress on this issue may be a 
pre-condition before making progress in identifying where 
the money can come from.
Moving beyond the rhetoric to consider the issue of climate 
change financing in 2014, even if an agreement were not 
reached, would send a signal from G20 leaders that they 
take the climate change issue seriously and would add 
momentum to the UNFCCC’s negotiations.  
4.  Maintaining the momentum to combat tax 
evasion and avoidance
Agreement on combatting tax evasion and avoidance was 
a significant outcome of the St. Petersburg summit. The 
G20’s focus is on reducing tax evasion by promoting 
greater tax transparency and the automatic exchange of tax 
information, and by dealing with base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS). BEPS are strategies used by corporates to 
exploit loopholes, particularly in double tax agreements, to 
make profits disappear for tax purposes or to shift profits to 
jurisdictions with little or no taxation.
Combatting tax evasion and avoidance is a major objective 
of most G20 members. Declining tax revenues are clearly 
a problem for governments at a time when many countries 
are fiscally constrained, but tax evasion and avoidance also 
raises domestic political concerns about fairness. Media 
reports that major corporations are paying minimal tax 
resonate powerfully with taxpayers facing the consequences 
of tight fiscal consolidation measures.
Tax is an area that requires international cooperation. 
Countries have long recognised the importance of 
international rules to avoid double taxation. However, 
with economies becoming more globally integrated, and 
multinational corporations representing an increasing 
proportion of global output, no country acting alone can 
combat BEPS. It is a global issue requiring a global solution.
At St. Petersburg, G20 leaders endorsed the automatic 
exchange of tax information by all countries, as well as 
an OECD action plan for multinational cooperation to 
establish an OECD/G20 BEPS project. This initiative has 
been described as ‘the most significant potential change 
to international tax for decades.’27 As chair of the G20 in 
2014, Australia must maintain momentum in reforming 
international tax rules. It is a complex and contentious area 
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and progress will not be maintained without an ongoing 
political push at the highest level. Australia needs to follow 
through on the initiatives of the Russian chair on this issue. 
The credibility of the G20 would be damaged if one chair 
launched an initiative that was considered to be of major 
significance, but was then seen to languish in the hands of 
its successor as chair. But while maintaining the momentum 
on BEPS must be a priority for the G20 in 2014, there are no 
quick fixes. Nevertheless, the G20 will need to demonstrate 
to the international community that progress is being made 
in meeting concerns over tax fairness. But it will also need 
to avoid setting excessively tight timeframes that lead to 
poor outcomes, or failure to meet deadlines which will 
damage the G20’s credibility.
In 2014, the G20 should focus on the following three areas 
with respect to tax evasion and avoidance:
• First, a major effort should be directed towards 
expanding the exchange of tax information and tax 
transparency. Priorities include completing the new 
single global standard for the automatic exchange of 
tax information in line with the commitment made 
at St. Petersburg. In addition, as a way to deal with 
BEPS, the G20 should drive the requirement for 
taxpayers in all jurisdictions to disclose more targeted 
information about tax planning strategies. The threat of 
reputational damage that can come from the exposure 
of aggressive tax planning strategies can be a powerful 
tool in combating tax avoidance. This should include 
reporting on the beneficial ownership of companies 
(that is, the identity of the owners of companies). In 
addition, a major effort should be directed at getting 
all G20 members to commit to the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, which is a global standard 
for revenue transparency and accountability in the 
extractive industry sector. Transparency is an area 
that can be advanced relatively quickly and does not 
require the negotiation of an international agreement 
or protocol, which would be a major challenge in 
advancing the rest of the G20/OECD BEPS action plan.
• Second, the work on BEPS should be presented as part 
of the G20’s efforts to deal with the challenges arising 
from a rapidly changing and integrated global economy. 
The core of the problem is the failure of international 
tax laws to keep up with global and technological 
developments, including the rise of the digital economy. 
But the pace of change is unlikely to slow and its impact 
is not limited to tax laws. Trade policy has also not 
kept pace with the rise of value-added chains where 
goods are now ‘made in the world’ rather than made 
in one country. Building on the factors underlying the 
BEPS work, Australia should introduce a more forward 
looking component into the G20’s deliberations in 
2014, with consideration of the implications of existing 
and likely corporate and technological developments 
on economic management and the need for improved 
international cooperation. The reality is that continuing 
technological improvements, such as 3D printing that 
could revolutionise production processes, are likely to 
result in further integration of economies. The G20 will 
have to respond accordingly. 
• Third, it is important that the work on increased tax 
transparency and BEPS is seen as a global exercise and not 
solely an OECD/G20 project. A priority in 2014 should be 
to ensure that developing countries are a key part of these 
efforts and that their needs are taken into account. For 
example, there should be a meeting of G20 and non-G20 
countries on the issue during 2014, with a particular focus 
on the implications of BEPS for developing countries. The 
G20 must avoid the impression that it has only given a 
priority to the issue of corporate tax avoidance in response 
to some high profile cases in G20 countries. Ensuring 
multinational corporations pay their fair share of tax is 
a major problem confronting developing countries and 
improving their revenue mobilisation capacity would be a 
major advance for their development.
5.  Mainstreaming development in the 
G20 agenda
Development has to be a priority for the G20. It is crucial 
for the legitimacy of the forum. The G20 cannot be solely 
absorbed with the issues confronting its members. Progress 
has been made on a number of development issues in 
the G20, including: supporting reforms and increasing 
resources for the multilateral development banks; enhancing 
food security; and reducing the cost of remittances. 
Notwithstanding this progress, there is much criticism of 
the G20’s development agenda, which has been described as 
‘diffuse, lacking a coherent narrative and disconnected from 
the central concerns of [the] G20…. .’28
In St. Petersburg, leaders committed to improving the 
activities of the Development Working Group through a 
number of steps, including concentrating on fewer key areas, 
enhancing coordination across different G20 work streams, 
and expanding engagement with stakeholders, especially 
low income countries (LICs). The priority for the G20 in 
2014 should be to act on these steps and better integrate 
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development into the G20’s agenda. This could be described 
as ‘mainstreaming’ development into the G20 agenda.
The development agenda should not be considered an 
addition to the G20’s main agenda, conducted independently 
from the rest of the forum’s processes through the 
Development Working Group. Specifically, in 2014 the G20 
should be more focussed on the development implications 
of all the issues it is pursuing. In terms of the proposed 
priorities for the Brisbane summit, this should include the 
following:
• The preparation of a coordinated G20 growth strategy, 
in line with the St. Petersburg leaders’ declaration, that 
includes the implications for other countries, particularly 
low-income countries. One of the most important things 
that G20 members can do for development is to restore 
strong growth in their economies. A more coherent 
G20 growth narrative must also take into account how 
the economic advancement of developing countries 
contributes to stronger and more sustainable global 
growth.
• The recognition that one of the G20’s motivations in 
promoting open trade is the positive role it plays in 
development. In particular, one concern about the trend 
towards mega-regional trade agreements is that they 
discriminate against developing countries.
• The recognition that the G20’s work on combatting tax 
evasion and avoidance is a vital concern for developing 
countries. Boosting their revenue raising capacity 
would significantly boost their development prospects. 
Developing countries must be directly included in the 
efforts to deal with corporate tax avoidance.
• The acknowledgment that the concerns of developing 
countries and progress on implementing the 
commitments on climate change financing will be vital 
to the future course of climate change negotiations.
• The significant enhancement of the G20’s outreach 
to developing countries. The current consultation 
process is insufficient and ad hoc. More structured, 
comprehensive and regular consultation with developing 
counties should be introduced.   
The Campaign
Ensuring that the Brisbane G20 summit is a success will 
require a targeted campaign by the Australian chair. Some 
of the key steps in that campaign should include:
• The Prime Minister must own the process: The personal 
involvement of the Prime Minister at all stages of 
Australia’s G20 presidency is vital. The Prime Minister 
must ‘own’ the agenda and be personally committed to 
the Brisbane summit delivering substantive outcomes. 
Early and regular contact with fellow leaders will be 
important. The depth of the Prime Minister’s relations 
with G20 leaders will be a crucial element in making 
progress on contentious issues. Similarly, the treasurer 
must establish a good working relationship with other 
G20 finance ministers.
• Release a concept paper: As soon as possible after 
1 December 2013, Australia should forward to G20 
members a concept paper outlining its proposed approach 
to chairing the G20 in 2014. The message should be that 
the process will be targeted, streamlined, pragmatic and 
most importantly, focused on results. It should state 
that priority will be given to effective communication, 
particularly in outlining how the activities of the G20 
are interrelated and aimed at improving people’s lives. 
It should also emphasise that the Framework will be the 
core of the G20 process.
• Outline the priorities for 2014: The overarching objective 
of the G20 in 2014 should be promoting stronger, more 
sustainable and more equitable global economic and 
jobs growth. In order to achieve this objective, Australia 
should outline very early in its presidency the specific 
priorities it will be seeking to advance at the Brisbane 
Leaders’ Summit. 
• Get leaders involved: It appears that leaders are 
increasingly becoming less engaged with the G20. 
Preparations for summits and negotiations of outcomes 
are left to officials. This was not the case with the initial 
G20 leaders’ summits. The challenge is to get leaders 
more directly involved in the lead-up to the summit and 
in working towards achieving outcomes. A targeted 
agenda that aims to make progress on some difficult, 
but important, global issues would attract the attention 
of leaders. But the G20 chair will need to be actively 
involved in pursuing the priorities for the Brisbane 
summit with other G20 leaders in the lead-up to the 
summit. This should involve overseas visits and regular 
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phone calls. A new initiative should be introduced in 
the form of video-conferences with leaders. The actual 
summit should be the culmination of an active campaign 
to achieve substantive outcomes.
• Engage the non-government sector: The G20 process has 
grown to include meetings of business representatives 
(B20), civil society (C20), labour organisations (L20), youth 
(Y20) and think tanks (T20). Each of these groupings 
has a series of meetings and consultations aimed at 
producing recommendations for the leaders’ summit. These 
recommendations are then submitted to the summit chair. 
This is an important part of the outreach process, but it 
should be a two-way process. The chair should seek to use 
these consultations to influence the domestic constituencies 
of G20 countries on the importance of achieving progress on 
identified priorities. The most important consultations are 
not those that take place within these consultative groupings, 
but those between the members of these non-government 
groups and their respective leaders, ministers and officials. 
The aim should be to use the consultative groups to build 
a groundswell of support for key outcomes at the Brisbane 
summit. Leaders are more likely to be responsive to demands 
of their own citizens than the entreaties of their fellow G20 
leaders or the chair. 
• Strengthen accountability: A number of steps should be 
taken to strengthen G20 accountability. Having a more 
consolidated accountability process for all G20 activities 
under the rubric of the Framework would be an important 
step. However, a greater effort should also be directed at 
involving the non-government sector in assessing whether 
G20 members are delivering on their commitments. 
Towards that end, a G20 ‘accountability conference’ 
should be held in the months leading up to the Brisbane 
summit, which would provide the opportunity for 
business, civil society, labour organisations, think tanks 
and academics, along with international organisations, 
to provide their views on the G20’s performance and its 
implementation of commitments.
Conclusion
Australia’s hosting of the G20 is both an opportunity and 
a challenge. It will be the most important international 
economic meeting that Australia has ever hosted. National 
pride will be on the line, but even more than that some very 
tangible national interests will be in play as well. Australia 
has a genuine interest in the G20 succeeding. A credible 
and effective G20 can help achieve stronger and more stable 
global economic growth, which is vital to Australia’s own 
economic growth. A weak and ineffective G20 is likely to be 
replaced by another international forum of which Australia 
is unlikely to be a member. If this occurs, Australia would 
lose the opportunity to directly influence the international 
economic and regulatory environment in which it operates. 
As it plans for the Brisbane summit, Australia should aim to 
actively engage G20 leaders to achieve tangible, meaningful 
results. This is the best way to reinvigorate the G20 and 
help ensure that it lives up to the aspiration of being the 
‘premier forum for international economic cooperation.’ To 
achieve this,  a major effort by Australia, particularly from 
the Prime Minister, will be required. But it will also require 
the input of non-government actors. What is required is a 
targeted, intensive, 12-month campaign aimed at achieving 
results. If Australia pulls it off, the Brisbane summit will set 
a benchmark for all G20 summits to come.
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The G20 was formed in 1999 following the Asian Financial 
Crisis, in recognition of the need to broaden the dialogue on 
international economic issues beyond developed economies 
to include emerging markets and developing countries. 
There were no formal membership criteria for the group, 
beyond it being described as a mechanism for a dialogue 
between ‘systemically important’ countries. The G20 
commenced with 19 countries and the European Union. 
Members of  G20 and share of  global GDP 
(PPP basis)
United States 18.9 Italy 2.2
China 14.9 Mexico 2.1
India 5.6 Korea 1.9
Japan 3.8 Canada 1.8
Germany 3.0 Indonesia 1.5
Russia 3.0 Turkey 1.4
Brazil 2.8 Australia 1.2
United Kingdom 2.8 Saudi Arabia 1.1
France 2.7 European Commission -
Over time other countries and international organisations 
were invited to G20 meetings. Spain became a ‘permanent 
invitee’. For the St. Petersburg summit in 2013, Russia 
invited Ethiopia (Chair of the African Union in 2013), 
Senegal (chair of NEPAD in 2013), Kazakhstan, Brunei 
Darussalam (chair of ASEAN in 2013), and Singapore (chair 
of Global Governance Group). International organisations 
are also invited including the Financial Stability Board, 
the International Labour Organisation, the International 
Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
the World Trade Organisation. 
Between 1999 and 2008, G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors met annually. It became practice for the 
chair of the meeting to be rotated between members. In 
2008, President Bush invited leaders from G20 countries to 
a meeting in Washington to respond to the global financial 
crisis. The G20 meeting in St. Petersburg in 2013 was the 
eighth leaders’ summit. In 2009 and 2010, there were two 
leaders’ meetings each year. Since 2011, G20 leaders have 
met annually. G20 finance ministers and central bank 
governors normally meet four times each year.
The G20 is an informal, consensus based grouping. It has no 
permanent secretariat. Preparation for the leaders’ meeting 
is overseen by national ‘sherpas’, acting as representatives 
of their respective leaders. The outreach activities in the 
lead-up to a summit now include business representatives 
(B20), civil society (C20), labour organisations (L20), think 
tanks (T20) and youth (Y20).
Annex:
What is the G20?
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